The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
Introduction
In major industrial nations, Central Banks set a long run in ‡ation target around 2%. The well known Friedman rule mandates a negative in ‡ation rate for the nominal interest rate to be zero. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) and Woodford (2003) depart from this Friedman rule and argue that the optimal in ‡ation rate is zero in reasonable economic environments. This gives rise to an anomaly because in reality the long run in ‡ation target (known as trend in ‡ation) is positive and around 2% for major industrial and emerging market economies.
This paper aims to revisit this issue in a New Keynesian endogenous growth setting. The focus of this paper is purely on long run growth and welfare implications of trend in ‡ation and that is why we abstract from any aggregate shocks to the economy. Even though there is a rapidly growing literature on trend in ‡ation, 1 little e¤ort is directed to understand the long run growth and welfare e¤ects of a positive in ‡ation targeting in the presence of nominal and real frictions in the economy. In our model, the link between trend in ‡ation and growth is in the form of imperfect in ‡ation indexation. If in ‡ation is not fully indexed, a higher trend in ‡ation by lowering the price-marginal cost markup could redistribute income from monopolistic pro…t to rental income earners. Through this income redistribution channel, trend in ‡ation could positively impact long run growth. The quantitative e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on growth depends crucially on the nature of price setting which is the central theme of this study.
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As in Ascari and Rossi (2012) , we analyze two types of price setting behaviour, namely (i) Calvo (1983) where …rms randomly reset prices, and (ii) Rotemberg (1982) where all …rms continuously set prices subject to some price adjustment costs. Growth e¤ects of a trend in ‡ation are very di¤erent in these two price setting environments. As in King and Wolman (1996) , a higher trend in ‡ation has an ambiguous 1 See Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for a comprehensive survey. 2 The positive e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on growth via capital accumulation resembles the Tobin (1965) e¤ect although the mechanism in our model is very di¤erent. In Tobin (1965) , a higher in ‡ation causes reallocation of portfolio from money to capital while in our setting, a higher trend in ‡ation could redistribute income from pro…t to rental income due to long run nominal rigidity.
e¤ect on the average price-marginal cost markup of monopolistic intermediate goods …rms in a Calvo price setting world. This happens due to the tension between price adjustment and marginal markup e¤ects. In the Calvo model, this ambiguity translates into a hump shaped relation between long run growth and trend in ‡ation. On the other hand, in a Rotemberg price setting environment, higher trend in ‡ation unambiguously erodes the average markup of the intermediate goods …rms along the same transmission channel described in Ascari and Rossi (2012) and promotes long run growth via boosting the rental price of capital. 3 The e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on the steady state welfare depends not only on how the trend in ‡ation impacts long run growth but also on how the trend in ‡ation in ‡u-ences the price distortion. In the Calvo model, the price distortion arises due to the dispersion of prices among sticky and ‡exible price …rms. In Rotemberg model, the price distortion arises solely due to the price adjustment costs. In both models, price distortion by causing productive ine¢ ciency and loss of resources engenders adverse wealth e¤ect on the representative household and depresses steady state welfare. After factoring the growth and price distortionary e¤ects, our calibrated growth model still yields a positive welfare maximizing in ‡ation in both models. As in Lombardo and Vestin (2008) the ine¢ ciency due to nominal rigidity is higher in the Calvo model than in Rotemberg. The relative output loss in Calvo model progressively rises when the trend in ‡ation is higher. This makes the welfare maximizing trend in ‡ation lower in the Calvo model compared to the Rotemberg model. The immediate implication is that the optimal long run in ‡ation is higher in the Rotemberg model than in the Calvo model. Both models yield a positive optimal long run annual in ‡ation rate. A sensitivity analysis of welfare maximizing in ‡ation shows that the optimal in ‡ation is very sensitive to the degree of in ‡ation indexation. Higher in ‡ation indexation raises the optimal in ‡ation rate in both models because more indexation of in ‡ation dampens the price distortionary e¤ects. In addition, the de-gree of competition also plays an important role in determining the optimal trend in ‡ation.
In our growth model, the optimality of positive trend in ‡ation rests on a comparison across ine¢ cient steady states. Two types of ine¢ ciencies are present in the steady state of our model economy. The …rst ine¢ ciency is due to market imperfection while the second ine¢ ciency results from nominal rigidity. A zero trend in ‡ation eliminates the second ine¢ ciency but could not overcome the …rst ine¢ -ciency. We demonstrate that in such a second best environment, a small amount of trend in ‡ation could be welfare improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we review the relevant literature on trend in ‡ation. In section 3, we lay out the basic setup and compare the balanced growth and long run welfare properties of Calvo and Rotemberg models. Section 4 reports the calibration. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
There is a substantial literature that rationalizes the bene…t of a positive trend in ‡ation. Svensson (1997) and Mishkin (2004) argue that a higher trend in ‡ation could reduce in ‡ation volatility and the impact of shocks. Blanchard et al. (2010) and Williams (2009) argue that in the presence of a zero lower bound (ZLB) for the nominal interest rate, a higher long run in ‡ation target gives the Central Bank greater latitude to lower the nominal interest rate. Billi (2011) develops a small open economy new Keynesian model with ZLB for the nominal interest rate and argues that the long run in ‡ation target is very low if the government commits in advance to a future policy plan. On the other hand, if the government follows discretion, the long run in ‡ation target could be inordinately high. Ascari and Sbordone (2014) undertake a comprehensive analysis of the adverse e¤ect of a higher trend in ‡ation on the stability of the aggregate economy. A higher trend in ‡ation shrinks the region of determinacy of the model. In view of this result, they caution about the pitfall of a positive in ‡ation target to mitigate the ZLB problem.
Although this literature provides useful insights about the rationale for a positive trend in ‡ation, it does not factor into account the long run growth consequences of a positive in ‡ation target because of not including capital stock as a reproducible input. Ascari and Sbordone (2014) note that little work has been done on the e¤ects of trend in ‡ation on the aggregate economy with capital. Our novelty is to understand the welfare consequence of trend in ‡ation via the growth channel which necessitates the use of an endogenous growth model. Since the thrust of this paper is on the e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on long run growth and welfare, unlike Ascari and Sbordone (2014) , we abstract from the e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on the volatility and stability of the economy and only focus on the balanced growth path using a deterministic model of endogenous growth with a simple "AK" technology as in Rebelo (1991) . Our model connects to a growing literature that highlights the di¤erence between Calvo and Rotemberg price settings. Ascari and Rossi (2012) focus on the long run new Keynesian Phillips curve. Damjanovic and Nolan (2010) , and Leith and Liu (2014) focus on optimal in ‡ation. However, these models do not look into growth e¤ects of monetary policy.
Although the primary thrust of our paper is on optimal trend in ‡ation in an endogenous growth model, our model has indirect implications for the relationship between long run growth and in ‡ation. There is an old thread of literature which studies the cross country relation between growth and in ‡ation. The nexus between growth and in ‡ation is still an unsettled question. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) use cross country data to establish that the long run average growth and long run in ‡ation rate are negatively correlated. Sala-i-Martin (1997) …nds rather negligible e¤ect of in ‡ation on growth for their cross country growth regression. In our context, the e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on growth depends on the price setting environment.
There is also a sparse literature exploring the growth and welfare e¤ects of in‡ation in a new Keynesian endogenous growth setting. Amano, Carter and Moran (2012) have a rich endogenous growth model with nominal price and wage rigidities and …nd that the negative growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation primarily arise from the distortionary e¤ects of in ‡ation on labour supply. Their model basically highlights the welfare loss of in ‡ation and thus unable to rationalize the positive long run in ‡ation target in a growing economy. Arato (2009) develops an endogenous growth model with endogenous contract duration and explores the growth e¤ect of in ‡ation but does not speci…cally address the issue of welfare maximizing in ‡ation target. On the other hand, the novelty of our paper is that we use a simple New Keynesian endogenous growth model and after factoring into account the positive and negative e¤ects of trend in ‡ation on steady state welfare, we …nd that the welfare maximizing trend in ‡ation is still positive and for a plausible price setting environment, it comes close to what we observe in the real world.
Basic Setup
We lay out a simple New-Keynesian model with three players: …rms, households and the Central Bank. There is a continuum of intermediate goods …rms in the economy in the unit interval. Each variety (j) of such goods is produced with a linear technology as follows:
where x jt is the amount produced of such good, k jt the capital used in the production and A is a productivity parameter. The linear technology (AK type as in Rebelo, 1991) is the vehicle of endogenous growth. Each variety is produced by a …rm with a patent right which disallows the entry of new …rms to replicate this variety. Final goods …rms transform these intermediate goods into the production of …nal goods (y t ) using the CES aggregator:
where is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The household owns the capital and all the …rms. It rents capital to intermediate goods …rms for production. There is no aggregate risk in this environment. The representative household's maximization problem is given by:
and the usual solvency condition, lim T !1
0 for all t. Notations are: t=time, c t =per capita real consumption, P t =nominal price, k t =average capital stock, B t =stock of nominal one period discount bonds in zero net supply, i t =nominal interest rate, R t = nominal rental price of capital, D t =nominal pro…t from the intermediate goods …rms, is the fractional rate of depreciation and is the subjective discount factor in the unit interval. 4 The Euler equations of the household are given by:
where r t is the real rental price of capital equal to R t =P t : Using (4) and (5) one obtains:
The Central Bank (CB) sets a long run target (i.e., trend in ‡ation) that satis…es the arbitrage condition (6). This means that along a balanced growth path the CB sets an interest rate as follows:
Equilibrium and Balanced Growth
In equilibrium, agents optimize which means that the …rst order conditions (4) and (5) hold. All markets clear meaning, c t + k t+1 (1 )k t = y t and B t = 0. Using the household's Euler equation (4) and assuming a logarithmic utility function, u(c t )=ln c t , one obtains the balanced growth rate, G:
Because of the linearity of intermediate goods technology (1), the …nal output production function (2) takes a Rebelo (1991) type "Ak" form with k as the average capital. Since there is no diminishing return to reproducible input, it means that the growth is self-sustained. The balanced growth, G thus depends on the steady state rental price of capital, r. The exact relationship between the trend in ‡ation and the steady state rental price depends on the nature of the price formation which we discuss later. Finally, to accommodate this balanced growth (G) and the in ‡ation target ( ), the CB lets the money supply grow at a rate G:
Calvo Model
We now turn to the price setting scenario of Calvo (1983) . In this model, all intermediate goods …rms facing the same technology are ex ante identical. Each period a …rm receives a random "price change" signal with a probability 1 : In the spirit of Yun (1996) , if the intermediate goods …rm does not receive a price signal, its price is increased at the steady state rate of in ‡ation ( ) subject to an in ‡ation indexation parameterized by 2 (0; 1). Lower means less indexation. This partial in ‡ation indexation formulation is borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2003) .
The cost minimization from the …nal goods sector yields the conditional input demand functions:
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where P jt = P jt 1 if j 2 (0; ) and P jt = P t otherwise. P t is the general price level at date t:
Firms solve the optimal price setting problem:
subject to the demand functions,
where M t;t+k is the …rm's nominal discount factor and T C t+kjt is the price setter's forecast of the nominal total cost at time t + k conditional on the information at date t.
The optimal price (P t ) is nonstationary and thus it is normalized by the general price level P t . It is straightforward to verify that:
where mc t;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real marginal cost. Given the linear production function (1), mc t;t+k = r t;t+k =A where r t;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real rental price of capital, where mc t;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real marginal cost. Given the linear production function (1), mc t;t+k = r t;t+k =A where r t;t+k is the k-period ahead forecast of the real rental price of capital. The law of motion of the general price level is given by:
expression for the average markup along the balanced growth path (BGP).
where M C t is the nominal marginal cost. Using (9), n is the marginal markup de…ned as
and based on (10), the price adjustment gap, P t =P t is given by:
Higher trend in ‡ation erodes the markup in a world with imperfect in ‡ation indexation as seen from the price adjustment gap term (13). To combat this, price setting …rm raises the marginal markup. 6 As in King and Wolman (1996) , the e¤ect of a higher trend in ‡ation on the average markup is thus ambiguous due to the con ‡icting e¤ects on the marginal markup and the price adjustment gap. The ambiguous e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on average markup could potentially give rise to a hump shaped relationship between the long run growth and trend in ‡ation. This happens because the balanced growth (7) is driven by the real rental price of capital (r) which equals A:mc: Since the real marginal cost, mc is the reciprocal of the average markup P t =M C t ; a higher trend in ‡ation has an ambiguous e¤ect on the balanced growth rate. The appendix provides a derivation of (11). For the steady state average markup to exist one needs the convergence condition that < 1 ( 1) which is 5.8% for the baseline parameter values. This upper limit accords well with Bakshi et al. (2007) although their model is very di¤erent from ours. 6 The appendix shows that @ n =@ > 0 as long as > 1. 7 While King and Wolman (1996) focus on the con ‡icting output e¤ects of trend in ‡ation, in our
Rotemberg Model
In Rotemberg (1982) all …rms continuously adjust prices but all of them are subject to a quadratic price adjustment cost measured in terms of …nal goods. We follow Ascari and Rossi (2012) and Ireland (2007) in specifying the price adjustment cost function subject to imperfect in ‡ation indexation as follows:
where ' > 0 is the degree of nominal rigidity, represents the indexation of the last period price level based on the trend in ‡ation, ; and is the degree of price indexation as before.
The optimal price …xing problem of each intermediate goods …rm is, therefore,
subject to the same sequence of demand functions as in (8). Since all …rms face the same technology and the same price adjustment costs, there is no heterogeneity in price …xing behaviour as in Calvo. Thus in a symmetric equilibrium P jt = P t for all j. Unlike Calvo (1983) , there is no di¤erence between average and marginal markup because all …rms charge the same price. Along the BGP, the average markup is given by (the proof is relegated to the appendix):
Higher trend in ‡ation ( ) lowers the markup due to imperfect in ‡ation indexation. Since the steady state rental price (r) is A:mc, this means that a higher trend in ‡a-tion unambiguously raises the balanced growth rate in the Rotemberg price setting model the trend in ‡ation has similar ambiguous e¤ect in determining the long run growth. The positive e¤ect is likely to prevail at a low trend in ‡ation.
11 scenario. 
Long run Welfare in Calvo and Rotemberg Models
For any arbitrary balanced growth (G), the steady state welfare (W ) function is given by:
where c 0 is the initial consumption. The initial consumption (c 0 ) and the balanced growth rate (G) di¤er between Calvo and Rotemberg price setting regimes. Hereafter, we distinguish between these two regimes with superscripts C and R respectively. Using (11) and noting that r = A:mc, the balanced growth rate (7) in the Calvo scenario is given by:
and the initial consumption (the proof is relegated to the appendix) is given by
where s is the steady state price dispersion given by,
The steady state welfare depends on the long run in ‡ation rate ( ) through two channels: (i) the balanced growth (G), and (ii) relative price dispersion channel ( s). The trend in ‡ation has ambiguous e¤ect on growth due to con ‡ict between marginal 8 Note that growth cannot inde…nitely rise because a lower markup depresses the pro…ts of the intermediate goods …rms which adversely a¤ects household's consumption. 9 Further details of the derivation of the steady state welfare functions are relegated to the appendix.
10 See the appendix for the derivation of the steady state price dispersion.
markup and price adjustment e¤ects. On the other hand, a higher trend in ‡ation elevates the steady state price dispersion along the same channel described in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) . 11 Although this depresses the initial consumption via the …rst term of (19), the ambiguous in ‡ation e¤ects on growth makes the sign of the comparative statics @c C 0 =@ ambiguous. The overall e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on long run welfare is thus ambiguous in the Calvo model. For the Rotemberg model, the balanced growth rate (7) is obtained by plugging (16) into (7):
and the initial consumption (the derivation is relegated to the appendix) is given by:
where
Since all …rms are homogeneous, there is no price dispersion in the Rotemberg model. Instead of price dispersion, the price adjustment cost acts as an implicit tax on TFP.
Higher trend in ‡ation has a hump shaped e¤ect on the steady state welfare in the Rotemberg model due to the con ‡icting e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on the steady state welfare. First, it unambiguously promotes growth, G R which has a direct positive e¤ect on the steady state welfare via the second term in (17). Second, it has a negative e¤ect on the welfare via the initial consumption term, c R 0 term (22) which falls because of a higher implicit tax ( ) on output as well as a higher growth, G R .
11 See the appendix for a proof.
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Calibration
To assess the relationship between W and quantitatively, we …x = 0:99 and = 0:025 at the conventional levels. The demand elasticity parameter is …xed at 6:00 as in Kollmann (2002) . The productivity parameter A is …xed to target the long run per capita quarterly real GDP growth rate at 0.49% which means an annualized growth rate of 1.97% for the sample period 1947-2014. 12 There is considerable disagreement in the literature about the range of values for the price stickiness parameter, : Kollmann (2002) . We then carry out a sensitivity analysis to check how the optimal long run in ‡ation depends on the size of .
It is di¢ cult to …nd an estimate of the price adjustment cost parameter, ', that is consistent with our growth model. Keen and Wang (2005) calibrate this by matching the slopes of the New Keynesian Phillips curves from Calvo and Rotemberg models. In our context, balanced growth rate is a crucial link between Calvo and Rotemberg models. In a similar vein, we calibrate ' by matching the balanced growth rates, G C and G R which yields an analytical expression for ' as follows:
The price adjustment cost parameter depends nonlinearly on the trend in ‡ation :
Note that ' is increasing in and not surprisingly at zero in ‡ation steady state, in ‡ation indexation parameter, plays no role in determining '. Figure 1 plots the growth e¤ect of trend in ‡ation for the Calvo model where both growth and in ‡ation rates are annualized. The hump shaped relationship arises which bears out the intuition described earlier about the con ‡ict between marginal markup e¤ect and price adjustment e¤ect caused by a higher trend in ‡ation. The positive price adjustment e¤ect dominates …rst and then the marginal markup e¤ect picks up. The growth maximizing in ‡ation is around 1.49%. The expression for ' in eq (25) comes from an application of L'Hosptial's rule to (24). 14 The balanced growth rate in our calibrated Rotemberg model is not very sensitive to the value of ': Figure 2 plots the welfare e¤ect of annualized trend in ‡ation in the Calvo model. A welfare maximizing in ‡ation results around 0.52% after balancing the negative price distortion e¤ects and the hump-shaped e¤ects of trend in ‡ation on growth. Not surprisingly the welfare maximizing in ‡ation is lower than the growth maximizing in ‡ation because of an additional negative price distortionary e¤ect on the steady state welfare. Figure 3 plots the e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on the balanced growth in the Rotemberg model. Since the average price markup unambiguously decreases due to higher in ‡ation, the steady state rental price rises which promotes growth unambiguously. The welfare maximizing in ‡ation in Rotemberg model is higher than the Calvo model. In both models, the growth at the welfare maximizing in ‡ation is 1.96% on par with the annual growth rate in the US.
To understand the reasons for the higher optimal long run in ‡ation in Rotemberg model compared to Calvo, we compute the ine¢ ciency in both models due to nominal rigidity. In the Calvo model the e¢ ciency loss arises due to the price dispersion, s as shown in (20) . In the appendix, we demonstrate that the steady state implicit tax on TFP due to price dispersion is given by ( s 1)= s: On the other hand, in the Rotemberg model the e¢ ciency loss arises due to the price adjustment cost which results in an implicit steady state tax on TFP equal to
2 as seen from (22) and (23). Figure 5 plots the ratio of these two implicit taxes in Calvo and Rotemberg for a range of annualized trend in ‡ation rates. Higher trend in ‡ation unambiguously raises the ine¢ ciency in the Calvo model compared to Rotemberg. This progressive relative output loss in the Calvo model vis-a-vis Rotemberg is at the very foundation of a higher optimal long run in ‡ation in the Rotemberg model. Table 1 demonstrates the sensitivity of the welfare maximizing in ‡ation with respect to and for these two models, C and R. The welfare maximizing in ‡ation is sensitive to the in ‡ation indexation parameter, . A higher indexation raises the optimal in ‡ation because it dampens the negative distortionary e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on welfare in both Calvo and Rotemberg models (see eqs (20) and (23)). For = 0:87, the Calvo model reproduces an optimal trend in ‡ation around 2%. For the Rotemberg model, the 2% target in ‡ation is obtained for a smaller value of around 0.74. The optimal in ‡ation is not very sensitive to change in the value of the price rigidity parameter except for high values exceeding 0.9. The less sensitivity of the trend in ‡ation to re ‡ects the fact that the Calvo price rigidity parameter generates primarily short run e¤ects of monetary policy.
A 2% long run in ‡ation target is, therefore, obtained for a value of the in ‡ation indexation parameter higher than standard estimates in the literature. Is such a high value of empirically plausible? As discussed earlier, in the extant literature the rule of indexation varies a lot and it is often based on ad hoc estimates. Del Negro et al. (2012) uses a hybrid indexation rule that makes indexation a weighted average of last period in ‡ation and the trend in ‡ation. Carrillo et al. (2015) …nd that the size of the indexation rule depends on the predominant source of the shock in a structural model. During the great in ‡ation periods, the indexation was close to 0.89 while during the great moderation period, it is close to zero. Although these numbers are not directly comparable to our long run framework, it at least indicates that there is no clear conventional wisdom of the exact degree of in ‡ation indexation.
The most relevant study in our context is by Ascari and Branzoli (2010) who make a persuasive case that the optimal in ‡ation indexation in the presence of a positive trend in ‡ation could be quite high. Their theoretical estimate of is 0.87 that is remarkably close to the estimate of for which the Calvo model reproduces a 2 percent in ‡ation. It is also noteworthy that in our model, a high value of is associated with a relatively high value of the degree of competition parameter, . We next show that a 2 percent optimal in ‡ation can be obtained for a lower value of if is calibrated at a lower level.
<Table 1 comes here>
Degree of Competition and the Optimal In ‡ation
How does the optimal trend in ‡ation depend on the degree of competition parameter ? A lower raises the ‡exible price markup. In the Calvo model, a lower raises the marginal markup (12) but it lowers the price adjustment gap (13) making the growth e¤ect ambiguous. A similar ambiguity arises in the Rotemberg growth rate (21) because a change in has con ‡icting e¤ects on the …rst and second terms of the average markup (16). After factoring these con ‡icting growth e¤ects into account, the optimal trend in ‡ation in both models, however, still rises as falls. Table  2 summarizes the result of this sensitivity analysis. In the Calvo model, the optimal trend in ‡ation of 2 percent is achieved for equal to 2.25 while in the Rotemberg model, it is reproduced when is 4.44.
<Table 2 comes here>
The upshot of all this sensitivity analysis in both Tables 1 and 2 is that the Calvo model always falls short in reproducing a 2 percent trend in ‡ation target vis-a-vis Rotemberg for reasonable parameter values. The low optimal trend in ‡ation in Calvo basically re ‡ects the greater ine¢ ciency due to price distortion explained earlier in terms of Figure 5 .
Why do nominal frictions ine¢ ciency persist in the long run?
The conventional wisdom is that all prices and quantities ‡exibly adjust in the long run and thus no ine¢ ciency due to nominal frictions persist in the long run. In our model, the principal driver of nominal friction is partial in ‡ation indexation in the long run. If equals one, both Calvo and Rotemberg pricing models revert to a ‡exible price model as seen from (11) and (16). The question is: what is the rationale for assuming partial in ‡ation indexation in the long run? We follow the reasoning of Ascari and Branzoli (2010) that neither zero nor full in ‡ation indexation is optimal in the long run in a staggered price setting environment with a positive trend in ‡ation. Ascari and Branzoli (2010) focus on the Calvo price setting without growth and argue that a lower has con ‡icting e¤ects on the price adjustment gap (P t =P t ) and marginal markup ( n ). A similar reasoning applies to our growth model. A higher indexation has con ‡icting e¤ects on long run growth via tensions on the steady state rental price of capital. In addition, in our model, the steady state welfare e¤ect of indexation is further complicated by the fact that a lower indexation elevates the 20 price distortion in the Calvo setting which depresses initial consumption (C C 0 ). 15 Ascari and Branzoli do not analyze the case of Rotemberg price setting model. It is straightforward to verify that a lower also raises the price adjustment cost term (14). Thus by lowering average markup (16), it unambiguously raises the balanced growth rate. On the other other hand, the initial consumption (C R 0 ) falls because a lower raises via a higher price adjustment cost. These con ‡icting e¤ects on growth and initial consumption make the e¤ect of a higher indexation on long run welfare ambiguous in the Rotemberg model. Thus neither zero nor full in ‡ation indexation is optimal also in the Rotemberg model.
Why is positive trend in ‡ation welfare improving?
In both Calvo and Rotemberg models price distortions either in the form of price dispersion or price adjustment cost give rise to misallocation of resources. The question arises: why does not the Central Bank eliminate this distortion right at the outset by setting the trend in ‡ation equal to zero? Setting trend in ‡ation to zero would eliminate the nominal friction and lead the economy to a ‡exible price steady state which is still subject to real friction arising from market imperfection. Such a steady state is, therefore, an ine¢ cient steady state due to the existence of market imperfection. If one compares a zero in ‡ation ine¢ cient steady state with an ine¢ cient steady state with a small dose of trend in ‡ation, the latter could be welfare improving. To see this more clearly …rst note that the real rental price in a ‡exible price ine¢ cient steady state is given by A( 1)= . The reciprocal of the ‡exible price markup imposes a tax on the TFP. The immediate consequence is that the balanced growth is given by:
As seen from Figures 1 and 3 , a positive trend in ‡ation up to a threshold could improve the long run growth rate in both Calvo and Rotemberg models compared to a ‡exible price ine¢ cient balanced growth rate as in (26). The welfare comparison is less straightforward. To compare the steady state welfare between zero and positive in ‡ation ine¢ cient steady states, we need to …rst derive the steady state welfare function for the ‡exible price steady state. Given our log-utility function and the linear production function, the optimal consumption and investment rules in a ‡exible price steady state are given by the Solow saving rules as follows:
and
The appendix outlines the derivations of (27) and (28). Plugging the consumption decision rule (28) and the balanced growth (26) into the welfare function (17) and normalizing the initial capital stock (k 0 ) to unity one gets
where W f lex represents the steady state welfare in an ine¢ cient ‡exible price economy. For the baseline values of the parameters, we …nd that W f lex = 353:0095:
In the Calvo model, as seen from Figure 2 the steady state welfare at the optimal in ‡ation is 352:9894 and for the Rotemberg model, the same is 352:9696 as seen from Figure 4 : Thus a ‡exible price zero in ‡ation steady state welfare is lower than a positive in ‡ation steady state welfare for our calibrated economy. The policy authority can do better in in ‡ating the economy a bit compared to a zero in ‡ation ‡exible price steady state.
16 16 In our present setting the real imperfection due to the existence of monopolistic market power is mitigated by a small dose of in ‡ation. Alternatively one can think of a production subsidy …nanced by lump sum taxation as in Gali (2015) to eliminate this ine¢ ciency. Although this remains a theoretical possibility there may be practical issues of implementability of such production subsidy. In this paper, we abstract from such …scal subsidy.
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Conclusion
The in ‡ation targets of the major industrial nations are consistently above zero which goes against the conventional wisdom of zero or negative in ‡ation based on welfare theoretic considerations. We set up a new-Keynesian endogenous growth model to address this apparent anomaly. Due to partial in ‡ation indexation, a higher long run in ‡ation gives rise to opposing e¤ects on welfare via its con ‡citing e¤ects on growth and price distortion. An optimal in ‡ation rate exists which maximizes the long run aggregate welfare. For plausible parameter values we …nd that this optimal in ‡ation rate is positive. The level of this in ‡ation depends on the nature of price setting in the model. The welfare maximizing in ‡ation is consistently higher in the Rotemberg model compared to Calvo due to greater ine¢ ciency in the latter caused by price dispersion. A future extension of this paper would be to examine the short run implications of in ‡ation targets in the presence of aggregate shocks. In this paper, we have focused only on Calvo and Rotemberg price setting scenarios. Another possible avenue of extension would be to investigate the implications of a more generalized pricing rule such as state dependent pricing as in Sheedy (2010) .
A. Appendix
Derivation of equation (11) Assuming a logarithmic utility function of the form u (c t+k ) = ln (c t+k ), the nominal discount factor (9) can be written as:
which can be written along the BGP as:
Along the BGP, the numerator of (9) ; mc
(1 ) and the denominator is
. Thus along the BGP, the optimal price setting equation reduces to:
Derivation of
Therefore, ln n = ln 1 + ln 1
(1 )( 1) ln 1
(1 )
Next note that for > 1,
(1 )( 1) 1
Derivation of (16) The …rst order condition for this price setting problem (15) of the jth intermediate goods …rm yields:
Since all …rms are homogeneous, they charge the same price in a symmetric equilibrium which means P jt = P t . Eq (A.3) thus reduces to
Along the BGP, t = , r t = r and
With log utility, eq (A.4) reduces to
, from the above equation the steady state average mark 28 up can be expressed as
Derivation of the steady state welfare function for Calvo and Rotemberg models
Along the BGP the steady state welfare can be written as:
The equilibrium resource constraint (3) facing the household is given by:
Dividing through by k t and using the balanced growth condition:
To derive the expression for (19), …rst aggregate the capital of all …rms as:
Using (1) and (8):
The …nal goods production function thus reduces to: where is given by (23). From (A.7) this implies (given the normalization k 0 = 1)
Derivation of (20)
30
We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). De…ne the price dispersion as: .9) (A.9) can be rewritten as a recursion as:
s t = t s t 1 + (1 ) P t P t (A.10)
Plugging t = and (13) into (A.10), we get the following steady state price dispersion (subject to the same convergence condition in footnote 4):
(1 (1 ) )(1 ) 1=( 1) (A.11)
Check that
The denominator is positive given that the convergence condition holds.
Derivation of (27) and (28) In a ‡exible price steady state with log utility, the rental Euler equation (4) can be written as: 
